Development and "New Law"
John N. Hazardt
Reassessment of the work that has been done in the field of law
and development is engaging an increasing number of comparatists
as the decade of the seventies approaches its end. A noted American
comparatist, John Merryman, has reviewed the entire field of American literature on law and development and has concluded that,
with few exceptions, it spells failure.' In his view, the actionoriented American approach has been incompatible with the intellectual styles and legal cultures of most developing countries, because the principal legal tradition in these countries, like the civil
law on which it is based, is more academic and more concerned with
theory than the American approach. The American law and development movement has failed largely because of a lack of communication-the developing countries are not able to understand the
"language" of the American approach. What is really needed, according to Merryman, is an approach that stresses "inquiry" in
pursuit of a theory on which to base third world action; "action" on
the part of American scholars is, and has been, premature.
For those determined African leaders who have "opted for socialism" and are bent on radical change, both politically and culturally,2 the proper approach, however, is clearly action-oriented. They

see law as an instrument to be used in effectuating policy. In contrast to Merryman's position, one African has stated: "What we now
know is that law is the creator of the future. What we can do is to
foresee and construct, through the techniques of the law, the framework of the evolution of the African future. ' '3 Similarly, it has been
argued that Africans sense no ideological obstacles to state intervention into the people's welfare4 because nation-building is more than
political activity; 5 it is essentially culture-building. Traditional or
t Nash Professor Emeritus of Law, Columbia University.
Merryman, ComparativeLaw and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and
Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. CoMp. L. 457, 478-81 (1977).
2 See Diarra, Les principes du parti, in 2e Seminaire de 'Union Soudanaise-R.D.A.
13 (Bamako, n.d.) (held at Bamako, September 5-7, 1962).
D'Arboussier, Les problbmes nouveaux du Droit africain, 50 PRiSENCE AFMCAINE 7, 9
(1964). Socialist lawyers take their inspiration from V. I. Lenin's "A law is a political measure.
It is politics." Lenin, 0 Karikature na Marxism i ob "imperalisticheskomekonomisme," in
23 SOCmNENUA 16, 36 (4th ed. 1953).
1 Uchendu, The Challenge of Cultural Transitionin Sub-SaharanAfrica,432 ANNALS 70,
77-78 (1977).
5 Id. at 75.
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colonial systems of law are to be restructured to provide social leadership in new directions. The customary law of the past and the
imported law of the metropole to which colonials had been forced
to adhere during their'bondage are being discarded. Lawmakers of
the future believe that their task is to provide vigorous socialist
leadership, whether they create new law as legislators, administrators, or judges.
Max Rheinstein, in whose honor this festschrift appears, would
have enjoyed participating in this discussion. Great comparatist
that he was, he travelled to many African states, soon after they
obtained independence, in order to learn what was happening to law
as the colonial administrators were removed. It is now perhaps fitting to review what has been occurring in the legal systems of Africa,
especially in those states where the leaders have chosen-the socialist
route to change.
Once it is acknowledged that these African statesmen see law
as a tool to be used in development, the question becomes what law
is required? An international congress of legal philosophers held in
Australia in 1977 placed on its agenda the topic, "Do developing
countries require a special system or type of law?"' In other words,
must law revision establish a special system, a "new" type of law
that will be unlike anything known before socialist concepts became
popular in the developing world?
Presumably those who formulate the question in this manner
accept the position of those comparatists who have divided all legal
systems on the basis of certain shared characteristics into different
"families" of law, with each family differing in some critical way
from the others. If these differences were not crucial, why would one
ask whether a special system or type of law has been brought into
being? Law would be "universal," indistinguishable as to types, if
systems of law were not classified as to "families."
If the classifying comparatists are to be followed, however, what
grid is to be used for purposes of comparison? How is novelty to be
determined? Providing an answer to this question is difficult because the stimuli to adopting socialist patterns of thought have been
varied. 7 Thus, to aid in bringing order into this discussion, it may
be helpful to analyze the question of "novelty" within three frameworks: (1)-the Western, (2) the Marxist-Soviet, and (3) the African.
'World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy: Law and the Future of
Society, Program, Topic F 4, Sydney-Canberra August 14-21, 1977. No publication of-papers
is planned. Only the Program has been published by the Congress sponsors.
I Various motives for adoption of the socialist path are reviewed in H. DESFOSSES & J.
LEVESQUE, SOCIAUSM IN THE THIRD WORLD V-IX (1975).
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WESTERN AND

MARXIST-SOVIET

SYSTEMS OF CLASSIFICATION

Apart from but related to the question whether the type of
socialism developing in Africa can be called "novel," is the longstanding debate as to whether socialism is itself a distinct family of
law. The debate has centered on whether Marxian socialists have
developed a legal system so different that it must be placed in a new
category of its own. The question, therefore, is whether "socialism,"
at least in its Marxist version, has created a new family of law that
deserves to be distinguished from the other legal systems.
Perhaps the most widely used method of classification is that
devised by Ren6 David. David popularized a system of classification
based on two main criteria. He groups laws into "families" according to the sources of law that the particular legal system recognizes,
and according to the philosophical, political, or economic principles
on which the legal system is founded." Using these criteria, David
originally identified three major legal families: the RomanoGermanic, the English common law, and the Socialist.? However,
there are those among the Western comparatists who deny that
8R. DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTAMES DE DROrr CONTEMPORAINS (lst ed. 1964; 2d ed. 1966; 5th
ed. 1973).
I In the early editions of his work, David suggested that two legal systems belong to the
same family when a jurist trained in one system can find his way in another, and when the
systems embody similar philosophic, political, and economic principles and attempt to realize the same type of society. 1st ed. at 18; 2d ed. at 16; but see 5th ed. at 22-23. Using these
criteria, David has consistently distinguished three Western legal families: the common law,
the Romanist, and the socialist. 1st ed. at 18-23; 5th ed. at 23-29. Although both are codebased families, the socialist legal systems differ from the Romanist in their revolutionary
character, their dynamic aims, the subordination of legal science to economics as a source of
law, and, as a result of the nationalization of the means of production, the shrinking of the
area of private law and the dominance of public law. 1st ed. at 22-23; 5th ed. at 27-28.
David's analysis of non-European legal systems has evolved over time. In his early editions, David questioned whether the Islamic and Hindu systems, which emphasized only the
duties of the just man and not the rights of the individual, could be characterized as "law"
in the Western sense. 1st ed. at 23-24; 2d ed. at 25-26. Later, however, he recognized that
Islamic and Hindu law is a necessary pillar of society even though it is yiewed more as a
paradigm'and an idealization of perfect law than hs7 something to be applied to concrete
problems. 5th ed. at 28-30. The Far Eastern legal family, however, differs greatly from Western law in that unlike Western, Indian, or Islamic law, law in the Far East is not a primary
source of social order but a source of disorder: harmony, peace, conciliation are seen as more
valuable than justice. 5th ed. at 30-31.
David's views on Africa have changed as radically as his understanding of Islamic and
Hindu law. In the early editions, he stated that Africa lacked traditions strong enough to
withstand the influence of Western legal systems. 1st ed. at 25-26; 2d ed. at 27-28. The
different African legal systems, therefore, belong either to the Romanist or the common law
family. By 1973, however, he had come to view Africa as more like the Far East than like
Europe. He now believes that in Africa harmony and the cohesion of the community are more
important than legal justice and individual rights. 5th ed. at 32.
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socialism is novel or-deserves to be classified as a separate system.
These comparatists argue that Marxism did not effect any fundamental metamorphosis in the Romanist system on which the law of
the Soviet Union- is based. 0 In their view the Marxian socialist
system in the Soviet model is essentially Romanist, albeit with a
veneer created by socialist imperatives, such as state ownership of
the means of production. These critics argue that the Soviet system
cannot be other than Romanist since it recognizes codes as the
source of law, excludes judicial precedent as an auxiliary source,
and structures its system exactly as Western Europeans structure
theirs.
A similar debate over the novelty of socialist law began in the
Soviet Union during the first decade after the revolution. Lenin had
directed his new judges in the People's Courts to apply Tsarist
substantive and procedural codes of law, but with restraint, influenced by their socialist consciousness." A year later, in November,
1918,12 the People's Court Act forbade any reference to the Tsarist
codes. Since the government had not had an adequate amount of
time to prepare more than isolated decrees to guide the courts,
however, the Act instructed judges to continue to apply their socialist consciousness in the absence of a decree covering the matter
brought before them. When calm was restored at the end of the civil
war in 1921 and 1922, a more formal legal system was installed by
the Communist Party, which took the form of codes of law. The
codes were drafted by lawyers, based on models that were familiar
to them from prerevolutionary experience or from their study in
13
Central and Western Europe.
Codification on the basis of prerevolutionary and European
texts stimulated debate among the Soviet legal philosophers of the
1920s as to whether the codes represented a new or an old type of
law. A former judge, E.B. Pashukanis, emerged as a leader in the
argument, taking the position that the forms of the new codes were
bourgeois because of their origin, even though they were being used
for a new purpose and had a new content. 4 Pashukanis's political
tO

See Lawson, Book Review, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 780, 781, 784 (1953). See also W. FRIED-

MANN, LAW IN A CHANGING

50.

"

SOCIETY 9 (1959).

Decree on the courts of Nov. 24, 1917, § 5 [1917] I Sob. Uzak. RSFSR, No. 4, item

,5People's Court Act of Nov. 30, 1918, § 22, [1918] I Sob. Uzak. RSFSR, No. 85, item
889.
13 For the steps taken to codify, see J. N. HAZARD, SErLING DisPuTEs IN SoVIr SOCIETY:
THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1960), especially at 301-13, 342-435.
tO See, .for his most noted book, E. B. PASHUKANIS, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
MAR XISM (tr. by H. M. Babb from the 3d Russian edition), in SoviEr LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 111

(H. M. Babb & J. Hazard eds. 1951).
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strength within the Communist Party was great, and his arguments
were attractive to the men of his time. Consequently, his view prevailed until the end of the 1920s when Pashukanis took a step that
he considered to be the logical consequence of his position. He began
to prepare for the "withering away" of law, which was to occur,
according to Marx and Engels, once socialism had been instituted.
To implement this theory, Pashukanis drafted new codes representing a new flexible system resting upon two pillars: (1) the discretion
of judges guided by general principles (as opposed to code provisions
defining crimes and fixing the penalties therefor), 5 and (2) an economic code to govern relationships between state enterprises as they
absorbed private enterprise."6 The 1922 Civil Code was to wither
away, eventually governing nothing.
Pashukanis was ousted in 1937, following what seems to have
been a slowly emerging rejection of his theories prompted by Stalin's 1930 speech to the Communist Party, which called for stability
and an end to any thought that the state and law would soon wither
away by degrees. 17 Pashukanis's disgrace was attributed to his failure to understand fundamental philosophical principles, namely
that law could not have remained bourgeois as it became infused
with socialist principles. The form necessarily changed as the content of the law changed. 8 In short, Pashukanis's successors argued
that a new type of law had been created, a law that was totally
distinguishable from the Romanist code-based system from which
it had evolved.
Since the late 1930s, the position has become firmly entrenched
among Soviet legal philosophers that the Soviet legal system is new.
This position is no longer limited to the Marxist-oriented world. It
has been used in the apportionment of seats in those world bodies
in which, by statute or custom, representation is based on adherence
to one or another of the principal legal systems of the world. For
example, the Soviet legal system is represented in the International
Court of Justice, the United Nations' International Law Commis11Pashukanis supervised the drafting of a code to implement his thesis. His draft codes
are available in Microfiche edition from Interdocumentation Company AG, Poststrasse 14,
Zug, Switzerland, under the identifying numbers R-9804, 9805, 9806, 9807, 9808. They are
analyzed and compared with contemporary Soviet codes by Hazard, The Abortive Codes of
the PashukanisSchool, 19 LAw IN EASTERN EUROPE 145 (1975).
11For an evaluation of Pashukanis, see Sharlet, Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture, in
STALINISM: ESSAYS INHisTomcAL INTERRETATIoN 155 (R. C. Tucker ed. 1977).
1' Political Report of the Central (Party) Committee to the XVI Congress, 1930, in SovIET
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 14, at 235.

" Yudin, Socialism and Law (tr. by H. M. Babb from
at 31) in SoVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 14, at 281.
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sion, and in non-governmental bodies such as the International Faculty for the Teaching of Comparative Law.
Eastern European legal philosophers follow the example of
their Soviet colleagues in that they see their own laws as falling
within the distinctive Marxian-socialist legal family, even though
they note certain variations on the Soviet model. Because of the
increasing variety of forms appearing in the codes of Eastern Europe, some legal philosophers have asked whether a limit on variation is to be imposed upon systems claiming to be Marxian-socialist.
Professor Gyula E6rsi has written recently that such a limit exists;
there are certain general socialist institutions that must be maintained if a given system is to be categorized as "socialist."' "
E~rsi's common core requires socialization of the means of production, a planned economy, and the socialist concept of rights
(that is, rights are protected only insofar as their exercise conforms
to the function for which the right is granted). He adds, moreover,
that the codes of family and labor law must be separated from the
traditional civil code, and that there must be a commonality of economic administrative forms for state enterprise, management, and
accounting. E6rsi says nothing of political structures, omitting any
reference to the necessity for a dominant or monopoly communist
party, or for the assembly system of state organization typified by
the "soviet." Western classifiers have thought that these features
were as important as the economic ones in distinguishing the
Marxian-socialist family of law. 0
Eastern European legal philosopher-comparatists attack
David's system of classification as artificial because it overlooks the
basic difference in legal systems-namely, the nature of the ruling
class which it protects. Relying upon their Marxist training, these
philosophers contend that the only persuasive basis for classification is the economic base on which the superstructure of the law
rests. Thus, Academician Imre Szab6 of Hungary argues that there
are only two great families of law in the modern world-the socialist
and the capitalist. For him, any distinction drawn between the
Romanist and English common law systems based upon differences
in attitudes toward source of law rests on no more than inconsequential detail.2 ' Professor A.A. Tille of the Soviet Union argues in a
,1See E5rsi, Convergence in Civil Law? in A SOCIALIST APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
45, 78 (I. Szab6 & Z. Pdteri eds. 1977).
21 For my own view, see J.N. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW: A SEARCH FOR THE
COMMON CORE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MARXIAN SOCIALIST STATES 519-28 (1969).
21 See Szab6, Theoretical Questions of ComparativeLaw, in I. Szab6 & Z. Pdteri, supra

note 19, at 9, 12-13.
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somewhat similar vein that no classification system is acceptable
that does not conform to Marxist-Leninist thought. Although he is
willing to recognize that there are differences between Romanist and
common law structures, he allows distinction only between the fundamental types, "exploitative" and "socialist.""
With the background of this brief description of the debate over
whether the Marxian-socialist legal family is law of a new type, let
us return to the law of developing countries: is it special, is it a new
type of law? For the majority of Eastern European legal philosophers, the answer would seem to be "no." A system is not "new"
unless it adheres to the models of Eastern Europe, at least to the
extent required by Eorsi. This conclusion is based upon scrutiny of
the literature appearing in increasing volume in the Marxiansocialist states, as authors try to determine whether what is happening in the developing countries meets with their approval.
In this Marxist-oriented literature, it is evident that the authors expect the developing countries to fail to achieve socialist
goals unless these countries adhere to what the authors conceive to
be the essential features of the Soviet model. 23 According to these
Eastern Europeans, this does not mean, however, that ages-old cultural patterns of life must be rejected. On the contrary, Lenin is
quoted to indicate that variation to accommodate culture is to be
expected; indeed it is necessary if political opposition to change is
to be held within manageable bounds. Yet there is a limit to permissible variation, as evidenced by Eastern European denunciation of
L6opold S~dar Senghor of Senegal and praise of Modibo Keita of
Mali. Senghor was written out of the socialist camp well before he
threw in his lot with the II [Second] International in 1976. Taking
such reactions as indicative of deeply felt attitudes, it appears that
Eastern Europeans believe that success in building socialism depends upon following their own models, and that, therefore, their
new special type of law, adapted to African conditions, is required
for developing countries if development is to succeed.
This conclusion is strengthened by a review of the discussion
emerging in Soviet studies in international public law. The question
posed is whether the municipal law of a developing country must
be taken into consideration in determining the font to which Soviet
diplomats will turn in selecting the institutions of international
public law suited to relationships between the Soviet Union and any
See A.A. TmLE,SOTSIALISTICHESKOE SRAVITEL'NOE PRAVOVEDENIE 91 (1975).
See R.A. ULI ovsKu, SOCIALISM AND THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT NATIONS (1974). For a
brief, popularized version of the approach of Marxian-socialists, see G. [B.] STARUSHENKO,
2
2

AFRICA MAKES A CHOICE 15-36, especially 32-34.
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given developing country. To understand the issue, the reader approaching the subject anew must bear in mind that Soviet foreign
policy is bifurcated; it is based on "peaceful coexistence" when
dealing with a capitalist country, and "fraternal"-based on
"proletarian internationalism"-when dealing with a ruling Communist Party in a state where a Marxian-socialist structure prevails.
The question posed within this framework is whether relations with
an avowedly socialist state in the developing world should be fraternal or should be structured on the pattern of peaceful coexistence.Y
Soviet scholars do not agree on the answer to this question. Some
say that unless a state's leaders adhere sufficiently to the Soviet
model to merit inclusion within the Marxian-socialist family, the
relations can be only those of "peaceful coexistence." This must be
so even when the statesmen of the developing country concerned
declare that they have "opted for socialism," or the "non-capitalist
path" and have demonstrated friendship. Other Soviet voices have
argued for a more fraternal relationship when there are such expressions of intent. Under the latter approach, there would then be no
current of ideological struggle in the relationship, as there must be
by definition of the 1961 program of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union when relations of "peaceful coexistence" govern. Although the debate seems to have swung in favor of the group that
relegates the developing world to the capitalist camp, in spite of
options for socialism, the very existence of the debate suggests that,
in formulating positions, Marxists will try to determine how closely
the politics and law of a developing country conform to the model
of which the Soviet Union is the prototype.
This is not the place to inquire into the classification of the
political and legal structure of the People's Republic of China. All
the world knows that leaders of the two giants said to be following
a Marxian-socialist path challenge each other's right to determine
what that path shall be. Each thinks the other has departed from
the path to such an extent that it has become capitalist, or, at least,
"opened the gates to capitalism." In consequence of this split, the
leaders of each of the giants apply their own standards to evaluate
what the developing states are doing, and each prescribes its own
model. For purposes of this paper, it is probably enough to say that,
while the conceptions of orthodoxy differ between the two giants,
both would respond affirmatively if asked whether there is a need
2" Ussenko, The Principle of Democratic Peace Is the Most General Basis of Contemporary International Law (in Russian with English summary), 1973 SoViET YEAR-BOoK OF
INTERNATioNAL LAw 13 (1975).
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for a novel legal system in a developing country, although each
would argue that only a system based on its particular model would
be truly novel. Philosophers in each system seem to be calling for
the introduction of a special type of law to further development, at
least if there is to be any expectation that production will be maximized, society structured to eliminate the exploitation of man by
man, and a basis for non-aggression established.
RI.

THE AFRICAN VIEW

Having suggested that the Marxists would agree that the developing countries need a new system of law, but would require it to
be based on their own model of socialism, let us turn to the Africans
themselves to see how they would respond to the question posed in
this paper. The system of classification favored by some Africans
perceives the primary fonts of socialist ideas in Africa to be two: one
may be called the font of "imported" ideas, the other the font of
"indigenous" stimuli. Each has its own distinctive approach to the
theory and practice of developmental socialism.
Take at the outset the "imported" ideas. What does this label
mean to Africans? The response is universally "Marxism," as developed by Europeans to meet European conditions as they were perceived in the nineteenth century. In spite of this European origin,
some Africans believe that Marxism has relevancy for Africa, not in
the precise terms of the Communist Manifesto of 1848, but relevancy nonetheless.2 There are fundamentals of Marxism that hold
a certain attraction for Africans, even now at the end of the twentieth century and on a continent quite unlike Europe. These are the
Marxists' emphases upon maximizing production and eliminating
"unearned income" so as to give labor its due. The attraction is
enhanced by what is seen to be the success of the Soviet Union, the
apostle of Marxism, in stimulating a startling rate of growth.2" For
African leaders, and even for those Asians who profess Marxism to
be an inspiration to policies of development, the Soviet Union has
created a model in its sixty years of existence which can be used not
for slavish copying, but for copying nevertheless. 27 Its economic
2 "We do not claim to have invented socialism in the twentieth century but simply to
have subjected it to the needs of our country." The words are those of one of Modibo Keita's
ministers. Kouyate, La politiqueeconomique de l'UnionSoudanaiseR.D.A., in 2e Seminaire,
supra note 2 at 51, 73.
2' See Thiam, Allocution, 1962 ANNALES AF1mcAiNas 37, 42 (1963). A Western scholar also

sees the Soviet system as, from one point of view, a model for development. Inkeles, Models
and Issues in the Analysis of Soviet Society, 60 SuRVEY 3, 5-9 (July 1966).
" "Our socialism will not be for us the manifestation of a tendency to copy servilely what
others have done." Keita, Discours prononce ' Bamako au meeting de masse a l'occasion du
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structures are thought to be conducive to rapid economic growth,
and its political structures are believed to be suitable to the creation
of a political machine capable of maintaining its manipulators in
power, even as those leaders force a sometimes reluctant citizenry
to proceed along a path of severe sacrifice thought to lead to the
glittering goal of abundance.
Turn now to the font of socialist ideas labelled "indigenous."
Although leaders finding inspiration in this font profess the same
goal of abundance, and understand the role of law to be that of a
guide toward this goal of abundance, their model is different. The
transformation of colonial structures is not to be achieved by copying the Soviet model in whole or in part but by reaffirming the
traditional values of the African village.28 This means that the state,
to meet the needs of development, is to be structured and administered on the model of the village. Politics must, therefore, foster a
sense of community like that permeating the life of the extended
family. There can be no narrow elite, as in the Soviet model, no
leadership group set apart from the people at large. Instead there
will be a figure comparable to the head of the family, and a group
comparable to the village elders who meet with him-positions
quite different from the leadership posts that characterized the Soviet Union during the Stalin years.
For African leaders building upon the indigenous model, the
emphasis upon "novelty" springs not from the importation of attitudes and structures developed by Marxist-oriented leaders on other
continents, but from the reaffirmation of tradition. The novel feature is the application of traditional forms on a level higher than
that of the village. Community attitudes are transferred to the level
of the state inherited from the metropole, a level which did not exist
for the traditionalists before their tribal structures were altered.
Thus, the change in scale creates the novelty, and this change of
scale requires new forms as well as new content. Legislation to guide
the activity of the entire people toward the goal of abundance is
required, since the hoary custom of the village cannot be a guide at
a level where it has never been known. This truism is accentuated

premieranniversairede l'6clatement de la Fgdcrationdu Mali, in DiscouRs ET INTERVENTIONS
36, 43 (1965).
2 "'Ujamaa', then, or 'Familyhood', describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalism,
which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it
is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man ....
Modem African socialism can draw
from its traditional heritage the recognition of 'society' as an extension of the basic family
unit." J.K. NYERERE, UJAMAA-THE BASIS OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM (1962), reprinted in
UJAMAA-ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM, 1, 12 (1968).
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by the fact that tribes and villages brought together in the new state
have no common customary law. Only the deeply rooted communitarian attitude of the village is common to all.
An examination of the various systems which are currently
being developed in Africa reveals certain elements that are common
to all. Whether the leaders of these countries feel a need to characterize their particular system as "new" may not be totally dependent upon any unique feature of that system. Instead, those leaders
who characterize their system as new or special may feel that such
a characterization is necessary in order to mobilize the masses in
support of the system.
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania is the leading example of an African
leader who denies Marxist inspiration and has built a system based
on an "indigenous" model of socialism. It is clear that Nyerere
would agree that Africa needs a "new" law, although he could rely
on no structure of thought such as that prevailing among Marxists.
His argument would be based upon a recognition of the need for a
community orientation surpassing anything known to societies
structured along the lines of capitalist economies. He sees socialism
as an "attitude of mind," and he has declared that adherence to a
standard political pattern is not needed to ensure that the people
care for each other's welfare."
Nyerere proposes to structure his developing society so that
men may not use their wealth to dominate other men. He advocates
the distribution of wealth along lines that are just, the abandonment of personal competition, and respect for the values of traditional African society. In his Arusha Declaration he calls for recognition that all people are workers, that there should be neither capitalism nor feudalism, and that there should not be classes of people,
one working and one living off the workers." Marxist-inspired socialists argue that state and cooperative ownership of the major
means of production is required to put these principles into practice.
Although Nyerere would agree, he takes an additional step. For him,
socialism must be more than economic, it must be political.
In Nyerere's view, political socialism requires that the government be chosen and led by the workers and peasants as a mass. To
achieve this non-elitist policy, Nyerere has organized a mass party,
which calls upon workers and peasants to nominate whom they will
for election. Then Nyerere's party, TANU, chooses two candidates
in order to provide a contested election. Membership in TANU is
J.K.

NYRERE,

supra note 28, at 1.

' The Arusha Declaration of Feb. 5, 1967, rev. tr. in J.K. NyRmRm, supra note 28, at 13.
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not limited to a carefully screened corps of activists, as in communist parties, but is open to all.
In an attempt to deal with the crushing poverty of many of his
countrymen, Nyerere has urged a policy of self-reliance rather than
reliance on an infusion of capital from the State Treasury. From this
policy has sprung the noted UJAMAA village, much like the Soviet
collective farm, but directed by TANU and not by a Ministry of
Agriculture as in the Soviet Union. In implementing this program
of self-help, the village leaders must emphasize that the program
requires nothing more from the central government than the assignment of some specialists during the learning process. Moreover, they
must recruit on a voluntary basis rather than with the use of compulsion. Reports from Tanzania suggest that the economy has suffered from several years of inadequate rainfall, as well as from
strong opposition on the part of tribal groups in some regions to
transfer to UJAMAA villages. Although these impediments seem to
have stimulated Tanzanian local leaders to compel peasants to
enter villages against their will-thus giving the Tanzanian model
some of the characteristics of the Soviet-Nyerere remains determined to avoid what he sees as the excesses of Stalinism. He wants
to create an African socialist model that is humanistic, communi.tarian, village-like, and totally African. This will make it "new" and
"special" in Nyerere's view.
Not all African leaders, however, see their developmental systems as "special" or even "socialist." Perhaps the least philosophical among the Francophone leaders is President Houphouet-Boigny
of the Ivory Coast. He has shown himself to be concerned with
structures that meet the needs of a developing country: a single
political party to provide inspiration and leadership; a stateoriented investment policy to make capital available for development and to assure that its use accords with a plan designed to
maximize the national product." In spite of these points of similarity with those of his avowedly socialist neighbors in Africa, the
Ivorian system is not called "socialist." On the contrary, the President has said that Ivorians live under "a liberal system, not a socialist one," and refers to his approach as "state capitalism."3 In spite
of a doctrinal training similar to that of African Francophones who
espouse socialism, he seems to require no inspirational slogans, no
need to call his system "special."
The Nigerians present even greater silence on "socialism." The
J. WORONOFF, WEST AFRIcAN WAGER: HoUPEmu=r VERSUS NKRUMAH (1972).
= Id. at 205.
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Military Council members-make no reference to it, nor do they show
interest in characterizing their system as "special." They have produced no ideologue like N'Krumah in Ghana who found his creed
in "consciencism." They are proceeding simply to build an economy
with a mixed system of capitalism and state-ownership, without
support from an inspirational political party. In short, they fit their
system to the needs of the times in a pragmatic fashion.
The contrast between the "special" and the "non-special" approach to structuring a developmental system has become evident
in Mali during its nearly two decades of independence. When Modibo Keita was ousted by the military in late 1968, the new military
leadership abandoned his socialist rhetoric and much of his political
and economic structures. His one-party system was disbanded, his
constitution was suspended, his National Assembly was dismissed,
and his restrictions upon small scale merchandising and private
production were erased from the statute books. His drive to stimulate the formation of producers' cooperatives was also abandoned,
although some sucessful cooperatives continued to function. Village
governments returned to traditional ways and the civil service,
under military direction, resumed responsibility for government of
the country as a whole. Only the state enterprises Keita had created
remained in state hands, and this was not for any doctrinal reason,
but because the labor unions feared for their future if private entrepreneurs from abroad were to buy up the enterprises. Industrial
capital and management were invited from abroad to build new
industry. Not until 1974 'was a new constitution promulgated, calling for the reestablishment of a3 unique political party and resumption of the National Assembly. '
Reform moves slowly; indeed the new constitution is not scheduled to come into effect until 1980. Although the Military Committee for National Liberation continues to rule, Chief of State Moussa
Traor6 has declared that the way has been prepared for a new party,
the Democratic Union of the Malian People. Its task is to mobilize
and educate the people to compensate for the continuing lack of
unity and national solidarity.3 5 Thus, the party seems not to be
based wholly on the Soviet model, but it is to perform part of a
" See D~clarationde la Nation, in R~publique du Mali, Deux annles de gestion de
Comitk Militaire de Libgration Nationale. Declarations du Lieutenant Moussa Traor6 3
(Koulouba, n.d., c. 1971).
For text, see 1974 JOuRNAL OmcmL DE LA R9PUBLIQUE DU MALI No. 440 (July 25, 1974),
text reprinted in UNIVFEsTrr DE DAKAR, DOCUMENTATION LzoisLATivE AnucAcUz, 1975, No. 1,
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communist party's function. Perhaps Traor6 has had his eyes on his
neighbor to the north, Algeria.
Algeria has also proceeded through a cycle, beginning with the
socialist fervor of Ben Bella and proceeding to Boumedienne's more
pragmatic system. 6 Ben Bella copied Yugoslavia's selfmanagement systems for both agriculture and industry when he
nationalized former French possessions, but Boumedienne has retreated so far from this system that little is left of it. Although Ben
Bella began with a National Assembly, Boumedienne disbanded it,
and is only now resurrecting it to provide high level participation
in government. He weakened the unique political party until some
Algerians said it had, in effect, ceased to exist, although he is now
reemphasizing its mobilizing function within the restored framework of parliamentary democracy. The rhetoric of socialism remains, but the model is not the Soviet one, nor has it ever been in
spite of its 6tatism and strong centralized control.37 Private enterprise has continued to flourish in the service trades and in small
productive units.
CONCLUSION

The variety of experiences discussed in this paper suggests that
in structuring their legal systems, leaders of developing states take
into account economic and political reality. Foremost among these
realities is the need for capital. Therefore, leaders of developing
countries locate potential sources of capital and determine how best
to mobilize these sources. Some states have private entrepreneurs
with capital and skills, such as the Tatas in India. In such places,
laws can be drafted to permit the private enterprise system to flourish, notwithstanding certain restrictions to assure community advantage. But in countries where there are no skilled or rich private
entrepreneurs the approach must be different. Algeria and Senegal
have enacted investment codes to attract foreign skills and capital
while retaining the planning function in the government's hands.
The methods used to control foreign investment sometimes include
requiring a state license for every endeavor, and appointing corporate officers chosen from the nationals of the developing country
concerned.
Doctrinally-inclined leaders, such as Nyerere, have shown that
they prefer state development of natural resources without the in36 For a review of the policies and practice of the early years of Algerian independence,
see D. OrrAWAY & M. OTTAWAY, ALGEMA: THE POLTICS OF A SOCIALIST REVOLUTION (1970).
37 A suggestion of possible comparison is in Hazard, The Residue of Marxist Influence
in Algeria, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 194 (1970).
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tervention of private licensees. But this doctrinal position is also
emulated by leaders who have no doctrinal foundation, as in Nigeria
and the Ivory Coast. Thus, it is difficult to claim that the base for
a special type of law for developing countries has necessarily been
laid when national resources are state-owned and exploited. State
ownership alone is not a key to classifying a system as "new" or
''special."
Beyond the ownership and operations level there is the matter
of state economic planning. Without exception the leaders of developing states have sensed that national welfare can be furthered
more rapidly if production is conducted in accordance with a state
economic plan than if private enterprise is left to function on a
laissez faire basis. The only choice on this level seems to be whether
the plan shall be detailed ("directive") or generalized
("indicative"), containing only priorities for investment.
Once a leadership has opted for a certain type of economic
system, its second task is to choose political structures capable of
directing and controlling the choices of the masses so that the economic plan, with its sacrifice of consumers' desires, will not be
resisted. Few leaders seem confident that the masses will make the
proper choices without strong leadership, for they surmise that the
masses will prefer a consumer-oriented path to a growth-oriented
path.
Most leaders have chosen a one-party or a dominant party system for what it appears to offer as a means of retaining power in the
face of opposition. Some of those who are close to an orthodox Marxist position can support their choice of political structure by referring to the Marxist position that political parties represent classes
in the class struggle, and that where there is no struggle there need
be no parties other than the one representing the workers and peasants. Most leaders, however, seem to choose the unique party for
what it offers in maintaining power and because of its potential for
mobilizing the masses through vigorously led campaigns. This
seems to be the reason for unique parties in Tanzania and restructured Mali, as well as in Algeria since Boumedienne's reform of
political life.
Senghor in Senegal has provided the most unusual variation on
this political structure. While requiring that his own party remain
dominant, he has planned a political structure which places his
party in the center with one party on each side of it. Thus, three
parties offer a variety of positions to the voter, but the right and the
left are kept in minority status. The minority parties seem to have
the function of presenting limited alternatives so that the dominant
party may gauge trends in public opinion. They also perform a
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watch-dog function against corruption among local officials of the
state and dominant party, which might otherwise go undiscovered.
This chronicle could be extended to explore other areas of social
organization, such as the role of the trade union in the political
process, or the system to be fostered in ownership and use of land,
which is the primary resource of most developing- countries. Space
does not permit this expansion of coverage, nor is it necessary in
order to respond to the question posed in the paper. The facts have'
been marshalled sufficiently, it is hoped, to sketch the outlines of
what the leadership in developing countries believes necessary to
development, both economically and politically. The way has been
prepared for a conclusion to the question.
To the pragmatist the anwer must be clear: certain measures
have universally been found necessary in the developing states to
mobilize the economy. There is evident variation, but the key points
of the pattern stand out. There seems, however, to be no need on
the part of some statesmen to characterize the result as "special"at least the Nigerians and the Ivorians do not seem to express such
a need.
To the doctrinaire leaders, however, characterization is necessary in the interest of national mobilization, if not also to satisfy a
leader's personal desire to stand among his people and the world
generally as an innovator, a philosopher, a guide along a path of
universal significance. For such personalities, the nature of the legal
structures devised to achieve developmental purposes has greater
significance. Structures must inspire a respect from the people that
could not be achieved unless the structures were characterized as
"special," or "new." They must be related to the long tortuous
progress of mankind through the ages toward the goal of abundance
and the end of social strife.

